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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
PERSONAL IDENTITY
Alexander R. Pruss

Persons have objective, not socially defined, identity conditions. I shall argue
that robots do not, unless they have souls. Hence, robots without souls are
not persons. And by parallel reasoning, neither are we persons if we do not
have souls.

Introduction
Could a computer or robot be a person: a being that, at least under normal circumstances, is a thinker and an agent, responsible for its thoughts
and actions?
Let me clarify the question a little. Research in Artificial Intelligence
is progressing. It is, admittedly, progressing more slowly than was once
expected, but it is moving ahead. It seems not unlikely that one day robots
will be able to function in ways that will look just like the functioning of a
person. If so, we will be able to have what seem to be conversations with
them, and get what seem to be the sorts of answers that a person would
give. I am not asking in this paper whether this much is possible. I am asking, rather, whether even if we achieved all this, this would be genuine
personhood. This question is, I think, tightly bound up with the question
whether the robots would be thinking and acting rationally, or whether it
would merely appear that they are.1
The mere appearance of thinking and acting rationally is not so hard to
get. If I can get a good estimate of the sorts of questions someone might
ask a computer, I can program the computer to give pre-programmed answers to those questions. You ask what the computer’s name is, and the
computer utters the sound: “I am HAL.” If I am good enough at this, I can
make people think that the computer is really communicating, is really
telling them what it is thinking. But just pre-programming a lot of answers
to questions does not give the computer an understanding of the questions and answers.
Even a somewhat more sophisticated program need not have understanding. I can right now put into Google the question “What is seven
plus five?” and immediately Google comes back with “seven plus five =
1
Cf. John Searle, “Minds, Brains and Programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980), pp.
417–457.
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twelve.” The engineers at Google programmed their servers to recognize
arithmetical expressions in English, and then to compute answers. But
there is no understanding on the part of the computer at least as yet—there
is just the non-conscious processing of patterns of characters, with no responsibility or thought.
While it is an interesting technological question whether we can make
a robot that externally seems to behave just like a person, passes psychological tests and so on, the philosophical question is whether we could make
such a robot that would be a person, and not just seem to be a person. Or
would such a robot just be non-consciously processing patterns, with no
responsibility or thought?
I will approach this question through considerations of personal identity. We can ask various questions about the identity of persons, for instance
across times. We can ask whether this person here and now is the same as
that being there and then. There was a certain five-year-old who grew up
to be me. Was that five-year-old the same person as I am? I think the answer is clearly “Yes.” On the other hand, there was a once a person named
Queen Victoria, and now there is a corpse at Frogmore, Windsor. Is Queen
Victoria the same person as the corpse? No: for the corpse is not a person
at all. (So strictly speaking it is not correct to say that Victoria is buried at
Frogmore—only her corpse is.) If you have a pair of Siamese twins, is that
one person or two? Surely two—each is a person, and each is a distinct
person. These questions are easy to answer.
But if I erased your memory completely, and then tortured the resulting amnesiac, would you be the one feeling the pain, or would the pain be
someone else’s? Unlike the questions about the five-year-old in my past,
Queen Victoria and Siamese twins, the answers to this question are controversial. Some maintain that your identity is guaranteed by the persistence of your body or maybe your brain, and so the amnesiac would be
you, and hence the pain would be yours.2 Some hold that your identity is
guaranteed by a stream of memories,3 in which case it wouldn’t be you
who is tortured after the amnesia, and so while it makes sense to feel sorry
for the person being tortured, there is no need to have a first person fear of
the pain, because you will no longer exist after the amnesia. And, finally,
some hold that your identity is guaranteed by the presence of something
over and beyond the body, a soul.4 If so, then answering the question is difficult, for we would have to know whether the soul remains in the body
after amnesia.
We may not know what the answers to personal identity questions are.
But it is, I submit, a part of the concept of a person that there exist answers
2
The classic piece here is Bernard Williams, “The Self and the Future,” Philosophical Review
79 (1970), pp. 161–180.
3
The classic account is Sydney Shoemaker, “Persons and Their Past,” American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970), pp. 269–285.
4
The best defense is Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul, revised edition (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997).
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to such questions, though perhaps the answers are beyond our knowledge.
It is crucial that either it is true or it is false that x, who is a person, is the
same being as y. For instance, the notion of responsibility presupposes identity: you are only responsible in the relevant first-person way for having
thought or done something if you are the being who thought or did it.
All my arguments will have the form of a reductio ad absurdum: I assume
that computers or robots can be persons, and then I argue that some considerations connected with personal identity probably lead to absurdity.
Consequently, I conclude that the assumption that computers or robots
can be persons is false. The basic theme is that I will ask a question related
to personal identity, assuming computers or robots can be persons, and
argue that the question probably cannot be answered in the case of robotic
persons. Since the question is one that would have an answer if robots were
genuine persons, it follows that robots are probably not genuine persons.
I will formulate some of my arguments in terms of computers rather
than robots. A robot is, after all, just a computer plus a more sophisticated
input/output system than the ones that typical computers have. Or we
may think of a robot being related to a computer in the way that a normal
person is related to a brain in a vat. Since one could be a person despite
being a brain in a vat, it is very plausible that if robots can be persons,
computers can, as well.
Finally, I shall stipulate that computers and robots do not have souls—
that they are made of nothing but the hardware, software and data. Richard Swinburne has suggested to me that the hypothesis that a soul would
come into existence when a sufficiently sophisticated robot was made
does not appear that improbable to him. But I simply will not count that
as a robot. I shall be talking of mere robots and computers.
1. Argument A: Power Switches
Suppose Robby is a robotic person, and I turn Robby off. Is Robby still in
existence when turned off? In other words, is Robby the same person as
the turned-off robot? I will argue that the answer, given the presupposition that Robby is a person, is both yes and no. Since the answer cannot be
both yes and no, we must reject the presupposition in the question that it is
possible to have a robotic person.
So, first let me argue that Robby is still in existence when turned off.
Argument A1a: Robby is an artifact like a vacuum cleaner or car. These
artifacts certainly continue to exist when turned off, and hence so does
Robby.
Note: This argument, plausible as it may seem, will not convince everyone. One might think that the essential component of Robby is the software, and in this way he is different from artifacts like vacuum cleaners
or cars (though as vacuum cleaners and cars get more sophisticated, this
objection becomes weaker). In particular, Argument A1a will not convince
those who have a subtler view of the connection between Robby the robot-
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ic person and the physical artifact than just saying Robby is the physical
artifact. One might instead say that Robby is constituted by the artifact, and
is somehow to be identified with the functioning of the software running
on the artifact. If one turns off Robby, the software no longer runs, and so
Robby ceases to exist.
Argument A1b: To be a person, one does not have to be actually thinking and acting. Otherwise, we would cease to be persons while in deep
sleep. All one needs is a capacity—or at least a well-developed capacity5—for thinking and acting. But Robby when he’s turned off surely
has a well-developed capacity for thinking and acting.6 He just can’t
exercise this capacity until one turns him on. Being turned off is like
being asleep, rather than non-existence.
Argument A1c: Some people think it is impossible to exist, then not
exist, and then to exist once again. If such temporally gappy existence
is impossible, then Robby is still in existence when turned off, since it
is clear that he exists before being turned off and after he is once again
turned on.
Note: This argument will be rejected by some on the basis of the case
where your watch is disassembled and reassembled, and is the same watch
again after the reassembly, since if that is possible, then temporally gappy
existence should be possible for Robby as well. However, there may be
a difference between the two cases. Perhaps the identity of artifacts like
watches is simply a matter of social convention, which allows watches to
have strange survival conditions, while the identity of persons had better
not be simply a matter of social convention, since the existence of social
conventions presupposes the existence of persons.7
Argument A1d: To conserve energy, a computer may turn itself off
until a timer goes off or sensor is activated, which will then turn the
computer back on at a later time when it is needed. (“Standby mode”
is something like that.) Suppose Robby turns himself off for one second
in this way, with a timer turning him back on a second later. It seems
very plausible to say that Robby is in existence during that second. But
now suppose that instead of an internal timer, there is an alarm clock
attached to Robby’s outside with rubber bands, in such a way that when
Robby’s switch is flipped to off, the alarm clock is set to go off in an
hour, and when the alarm clock goes off in an hour, it flips Robby’s
switch to on. Surely the fact that the timer is physically on the outside
rather than inside doesn’t matter.
5
The “well-developed” qualifier is required by Mary Anne Warren, “On the Moral and
Legal Status of Abortion,” The Monist 57 (1973), pp. 43–61.
6
One might worry that this is not a natural capacity because robots lack natural capacities.
But if robots lack natural capacities and personhood requires natural capacities, then there
cannot be robotic persons anyway, and my arguments are moot.
7
I have heard Robert Koons give arguments along these lines.
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Perhaps, though it matters whether the timer is external or internal in
this way. Maybe an external timer is not really a part of the robot. But it
would be strange if something attached with rubber bands wasn’t a part
of the robot, whereas something welded to it would be. So this way out
doesn’t work. The externality of the timer doesn’t matter, and so Robby
continues to exist even while turned off by the alarm clock, just as he
would even were he turned off by an internal timer.
But suppose that while Robby is turned off, I detach the alarm clock,
and bring it back half an hour later. Have I really made Robby cease to exist for that half hour by detaching the alarm clock? And anyway, why does
it matter what turns Robby back on, whether it is the alarm clock by itself,
or me plus the alarm clock (as when I take the clock away and bring it
back), or just me by myself? It seems that either in all of these cases Robby
is existent when turned off, or in none of them is he existent when turned
off. Since in the case where the alarm clock is securely attached, Robby is
still in existence while turned off, he is in existence while turned off in all
of these cases. Hence, he is in existence when I turn him off with the intention of turning him back on.
While there are objections available to some of these arguments, I think
there is overall a very strong case for a yes answer to the question whether
Robby exists while turned off.
But there is also a very strong case for a no answer.
Argument A2a: Robby, on our assumptions, is a person without a soul.
Only a person with a soul can exist while not alive (and even that possibility is controversial). But Robby is not alive when he is turned off:
life requires active functioning. If Robby, then, is like we would be if
we were persons without souls, then Robby does not exist when he is
turned off.
Note: Whether one accepts this argument depends on what one thinks
about frozen humans.8
Argument A2b: Let’s think a bit about what it could physically mean
to “turn off” Robby. One way to do this would be to press a switch that
disconnects the electrical connection between the battery and the rest
of the robot. But it seems to me that the answer to the question whether
Robby would continue to exist when turned off should not depend on
exactly how turning him off works. My son has a battery-powered toy
car where the switch works by physically pushing the battery away
from its connector. We could imagine that Robby’s off switch works by
pushing the battery out of him. But the battery is, surely, a crucial part
of Robby. Without such a crucial part, Robby does not exist, just as we
would not exist without a heart unless we have souls. So if turning him
off works by pushing out a battery, he doesn’t exist when turned off.
8
See Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp.
146ff.
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But it shouldn’t matter exactly how we turn him off, and hence no matter how we turn him off, he doesn’t exist when turned off.
Maybe, though, Robby’s memories survive while he is turned off, because they are recorded on a kind of memory that does not need electricity. Could we say that Robby, then, survives because of his memories
while turned off, even though he is lacking a crucial part? No. Our memories are presumably recorded in our brains, but we’re dead as soon as we
stop functioning, even though, quite likely, for a few minutes—or maybe
longer—our memories could still be recovered from traces in our brains,
if only we had the technology for it (there are science fiction stories about
this sort of thing). That a record of memories exists does not mean that life
continues, and similarly that a record of memories exists does not mean
that Robby continues to exist.
But suppose you’re not convinced by this. Suppose you think that as
long a record of memories exists, then Robby continues to exist. Well,
then, imagine a different thought experiment: All of Robby’s memories
are printed out on a very long piece of paper in small type. Then the electronic copy of the memories is destroyed while Robby is turned off. When
we turn him back on, the memories are typed in again from the piece of
paper, maybe by a human typist, maybe by a trained monkey, or maybe
by an electronic scanner that reads the piece of paper. Then, a record of
Robby’s memories does continue to exist while he is turned off and his
battery is removed. In this case, Robby shouldn’t count exist when his battery is removed, despite the printed record of his memories existing. But
there should be no metaphysical difference between a printed record and
a record on a disk, so neither does he exist in the case where the memories
are held on a disk.
Maybe, though, you think removing the battery is not enough to make
Robby cease to exist. Well, remove more parts, one by one. Eventually,
Robby doesn’t exist—there is just a desk full of parts. But at which point
does he cease to exist? There is no sharp line once the battery is removed.
The removal of the battery is a fairly sharp line—once the battery is gone,
Robby doesn’t function, doesn’t in any sense live. But after the battery is
removed, there are no more such sharp lines. Since the cessation of existence is a sharp line, removal of the battery is what makes Robby cease
to exist.
So, we have a strong case for a yes and a strong case for a no. We could
decide on a yes. But then the no arguments would be against us. Or we
could decide on a no. But then the yes arguments would be against us. The
right decision is to reject the supposition that the question was based on,
namely the supposition that there can be a robotic person.
I suspect that in the case of a robot, the answer to the question whether
the robot is still existing when turned off is given by social convention
not by the objective fact. In the case of a person, the question whether the
person is still existing at a given time is a matter of objective fact (though
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perhaps in some cases, such as those of brain death, this fact is hard to
determine). Therefore, robots are not persons.
2. How Many Electronic Persons Here?
When we’re dealing with persons, the question “How many different
persons are here?” should make sense for appropriate senses of “here”
(“here” need not be physical—it could indicate a context instead).
There are two basic ways to try to answer this question for electronic
persons. The first is to correlate persons with pieces of computing hardware. Some of the arguments in the previous section were based on that
kind of a view. On a hardware-based view, if there are three intelligent
computers, then we have three persons, even if one of these computers
is multitasking several intelligent programs, each communicating with a
different user through its own window. A second way would be to focus
on software, and to correlate persons not with pieces of computing hardware, but with streams of computation. Thus, a single computer could be
“inhabited” by a dozen intelligent persons, each constituted by a separately running process. I shall argue that neither approach succeeds in
giving satisfactory answer to the “How many” question.
2.1. The Hardware Approach
On the hardware approach, a difficult question is how to count pieces of
computing hardware. For instance, I am writing this paper on a laptop
with a dual core processor. Is this one piece of computing hardware or
two? A dual core processor is, basically, two processors in a single package. While one of the processors may be processing my typing, the other
may be checking for viruses. Yet to the ordinary user the laptop behaves
like a single computer, and Microsoft treats it as such (you only need to
buy one Windows license for it).
To some degree, our two-hemisphere brain may function like a dual
core processor. But surely the brain is a single piece of computation machinery—we are not actually two persons (leaving aside cases of split
brain patients). So if we’re counting electronic persons by counting pieces
of machinery, we should count my laptop as a single piece of computing
machinery.
But how does one, then, distinguish between a single laptop with two
processors and two laptops with one processor each? The physical condition that to have two laptops they would be in separate plastic cases is
clearly not right. If I took the insides of the two laptops and placed them in
a single box, they would still be two laptops—even if I glued them together
(Siamese twins are two persons). Nor can I say that I have one laptop
whenever there is only one keyboard and only one screen. After all, it’s
easy to hook up a second screen and a second keyboard.
Such physical criteria are, surely, beside the point. If anything makes the
laptop a single computer, it is that it’s functioning as a whole. There may be
two processors, but they are working together, in a well-coordinated way.
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But this coordination is a matter of software, not hardware. I could, after
all, connect two computers wirelessly to the Internet, and, running the
right software on both, operate them as a cluster that functions as a single,
larger computer. So it is not some kind of purely physical contiguity that
makes my laptop be a single piece of computing machinery.
If we employ hardware-based criteria for counting electronic persons,
we will at best get things wrong. But in fact, not only will we get things
wrong, we will get no answers in general. The question “How many computers are here?” is not answerable in general. Do we count two laptops
glued together as a single, more complex computer, or do we count them
as two individual computers? The same problem comes up for other kinds
of artifacts. Suppose I take three chairs and tie them together, side-by-side.
Do I have a single, new piece of furniture—a bench with twelve legs—or
do I still have three pieces of furniture?
In fact, I think it objectively does not matter what we say. The answer
is surely just a matter of social convention. There is no objective fact to be
discovered by metaphysical investigation of the chairs or laptops. It is simply up to us to decide whether we count a set of three chairs tied together
as one piece of furniture or three (or maybe even four). Of course, the answer may matter, say, for legal purposes. If I have an insurance policy that
covers only one computer, and then the two laptops glued together are
destroyed, then there will be a legal question whether I can claim the total
loss or only half of it. But the answer is one to be determined by the courts,
or by linguistic convention, rather than by mind-independent facts.
But this is not so for persons. The question of how many persons there
are, whether here there are two persons or one person, has an objective answer, one the courts can be wrong about, though sometimes we may not be
able to find that objective answer. And what I said about computers applies
just as much to robots. Therefore, if the hardware approach to counting
electronic persons is right, then robots can’t be persons. For if they were
persons, there would be objective answers to the question of how many of
them there are. But there are no objective answers available for such questions about electronic persons, at least on the hardware approach.
2.2. The Software Approach
The software approach is more promising. On this view, if I run one intelligent program on one processor core and another on another core, I have
two electronic persons, but likewise if I run them both on one core, I still
have two electronic persons. If, on the other hand, I run a single intelligent program in parallel fashion on several processors, indeed on several
computers, each computer doing its part of the total computation task,
then I have only one person, spanning multiple computers. This software
approach is promising as it embodies the conviction of those who believe
in the possibility of strong Artificial Intelligence that it is not the physical
substrate that matters for personhood, but what matters is the computation
that is going on.
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However, the software approach to counting persons also runs into difficulties. One of these is that if it is applied to us, it may mean that a human
being with multiple personalities is literally more than one person—there
is more than one stream of computation going on there. Maybe, though,
you do not think that is absurd, or maybe you think the approach cannot
be applied to us, but only to electronic persons.
A second difficulty is that it is sometimes difficult to count streams of
computation. Suppose that I want to compute the positions of the planets
in 10,000 years. But I want to be really sure of the result. So I take eleven
computers with the same hardware specifications. One of these computers, then, sends to each of the other ten the task to compute the positions
of the planets in 10,000 years using the laws of physics and the present
positions, giving each of the ten the same program to run. The coordinating computer then continually checks to make sure that the memory state
of each of the ten computers is, at each time, exactly the same. As soon as
the memory state of one of the ten computers deviates from the others, the
coordinating computer modifies the deviant to match the others. (If more
than one deviates at the same time, the coordinating computer goes crazy
and explodes everything, maybe, or maybe conforms the minority to the
majority if possible.)
Should I see this situation as consisting of ten streams of computation
of the positions of the planets? Or maybe eleven (ten individual ones plus
the whole consisting of the coordinator plus the ten subsidiaries)? But the
ten streams of computation are highly interdependent. The coordinating
computer ensures that as soon as any deviation occurs, the coordinating
computer cancels out the deviation. If it is interdependence that defines
a single stream of computation, then I think the right thing to say in this
case is that there is only one stream of computation.
Now let us imagine a version of this hypothesis for intelligent programs
(it doesn’t require intelligence to compute the positions of the planets).
We have ten intelligent computers, that is ten computers running an intelligent program. And we have an eleventh computer—this one isn’t intelligent since its task is simple—which gives them all the same input, and
monitors their functioning. As soon as any of the ten were to diverge from
the others, the eleventh would push the divergent computer back to the
same state as the others. But let us suppose that in fact there is no divergence. Here, I think, we can make a good case for the hypothesis that we
have ten intelligent programs, each running on one computer, as well as
for the hypothesis that we have one intelligent program, running on a system consisting of eleven computers.
First let me argue that we have ten intelligent programs. Let us suppose that in fact none of the ten computers diverges from the others—no
malfunctions occur.9 The fact that they are always thinking the same thing
9
And if there are any indeterministic events going on in the computation, they happen to
go the same way for all of them.
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does not make them be one person. After all, it is quite possible, though
unlikely, for two people to be always thinking the same thing—imagine
you and an identical twin on a planet just like ours, where everything is
just like here. And why should the existence of a coordinating computer
make them all be one person, if the coordinating computer does not actually do anything to them?—it just watches for deviations, but if there are no
deviations, as on our present hypothesis there are not, it does nothing.
Suppose you are one of three identical triplets who always think the
same thoughts. If Big Brother watches you and your two triplets, and
will force the thoughts of each to conform to the thoughts of the majority
whenever there is divergence (and blow up all of you if there is no majority), that does not make the triplets into a single individual, at least if they
all always happen to agree with one another without having to be forced
to (this is, of course, like Frankfurt cases in discussions of free will).10
On the other hand, it seems clear that overall we have a single computational system, made up of eleven sub-parts. This single computational
system is running an intelligent program with the additional feature that
the intelligent program is more resistant to hardware failure (since deviations get canceled out).
Perhaps, then, the right way to look at this is to say that we have eleven
persons. One is the system as a whole (running on an aggregate of eleven
computers), and then there are the ten component persons (the coordinating computer does not count as a person, because it isn’t intelligent—it
just automatically cancels out deviations in functioning). So we have one
person who has ten more persons as parts. That isn’t of itself absurd, perhaps. (Or is it? Maybe it would imply that each of us is a person who has
two persons—one per brain hemisphere—as parts?)
But what does seem absurd is that just by inserting a coordinator who
in fact does nothing (because nothing is to be done), one has created a new
person. Suppose that you and your two identical triplets are going along
thinking the same thoughts. And then a non-intelligent computer is put
into place, whose job is to ensure that your and your triplets’ thoughts
never diverge. As soon as the thoughts diverge, the computer will make
them converge again. But in fact, your thoughts do not ever diverge. So in
fact the computer doesn’t affect anything. Yet, a fourth person is thereby
immediately created if we accept the view above that there are eleven persons in the computer case. This seems absurd.
Furthermore, if inserting the unintelligent coordinator creates a new
person, then destroying the coordinator kills the person, and this is, of
course, morally wrong without strong reason. But there seems to be nothing wrong with destroying the coordinator.
Moreover, I perhaps don’t even need a coordinating computer to get
the problematic result. Let’s take ten computers, and run different copies
10
Harry G. Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), pp. 829–839.
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of the same intelligent program on each, and give each the same input.
We can think of the ten computers as together running a single program in
a more reliable way simply by treating them as a unit—once the output
comes, we simply accept the majority output (typically the outputs will be
the same). It is up to us, after all, how to interpret the outputs. But surely
how we think of a bunch of persons does not affect how many persons
there are.
Thus, on the software view, it is also true that the question of how many
programs are running is answered by our subjective decision as to how we
want to consider a situation: do we want to think of it as a system running
one program, or several systems running several copies of a program, or
maybe in some other way? Again, there does not appear to be an objective
answer to the question of how many intelligent running programs there
are. And so running programs are not persons, since there is an objective
answer to “how many” questions in regard to persons.
Still, the software view seems to work better than the hardware view. So
for the next identity question, I will only consider the software view.
3. Identity Over Time
I can take a piece of software running on one computer, record all the
computer’s memory to disk, erase the memory, put the disk in another
computer, restore the data from disk to the memory of that computer, and
continue running the software there. On a software view of the nature of
electronic persons, if the software constitutes a person, the person should
survive such transfer—after all, the stream of computation continues.
One question to ask is whether the alleged electronic person exists
when the software is not running and all we have is a memory record on
the disk. We asked this question when we considered whether Robby existed while turned off. This question leads to problems for the proponent
of the possibility of electronic persons. For it is absurd to suppose that an
inert disk, or even the information on it, could be a person. On the other
hand, how does the case where the data is temporarily on a disk actually
differ that significantly from what happens during the ordinary execution
of a modern computer program? After all, when a program is running,
sometimes the computer just keeps it stored inertly in memory while doing something else—one of the ways modern computers multitask is by
switching tasks. So if the disk or the data on it is not a person, neither
would electronic persons exist except precisely when the computer is doing something with the programs that constitute them. But if so, then by
parallel, it seems that should my mental activity pause for a moment, I
would not exist then, which appears false.
But I want to focus on a different, and very standard in the theory of
personal identity, set of questions. Call the electronic person I had before
the memory recording “Robby.” Suppose that I actually make two copies of the memory record, and then simultaneously put them into two
computers. Where does Robby go? Does Robby inhabit both computers
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now? But that seems absurd. After all, the two computers might now be
given different inputs, and thus might be doing different things at the
same time. Does the program as running on one of the computers need to
be afraid if the program as running on the other computer is facing pain
(after all, if computers could be intelligent, then probably they could suffer pain)? Surely not.
Or does Robby inhabit only one of the computers? But which one? After all, the data was put into both simultaneously. Again, there does not
seem to be an answer to this question.
Or, perhaps, Robby inhabits no computer after his data has been sent
to two computers. But then it follows that if Robby’s data is restored on
only one computer, Robby continues to exist, but if it is restored on two,
Robby ceases to exist. This, too, seems very strange. Let’s suppose that
when Robby’s data is put on a disk, a copy of the disk is carried in a spaceship going to a far away star. Why should it affect the question whether
Robby exists on earth what is done with the copy of the disk on the spaceship? Yet, if on the spaceship the data is restored at the same time as the
one on earth, then Robby ceases to exist on this hypothesis, but if only the
disk that is on earth is restored, then Robby continues to exist on earth.
And if both disks are restored, but one before the other, then, plausibly,
Robby resumes existence in the place where the earlier restoration happened (after all, if the later restoration doesn’t happen, then Robby will
exist where the earlier one happened, and where Robby is shouldn’t depend on what disks are restored in the future). But then the answer to the
question whether Robby comes to be on the spaceship or on earth may
well depend on the reference frame—for on relativistic grounds it may
well depend on the reference frame which restoration happened first.11
So it seems that there is no good answer to the question whether and
where Robby continues to exist in this thought experiment. But in any
real situation, when dealing with persons, there has to be an objective fact
whether the person continues to exist or not.
4. What About Human Persons?
But there is a serious weakness in all of the above arguments. In these arguments, I suggested that certain questions about personal identity have
no answers in the case of electronic persons. But there are exactly parallel
questions that we can ask about human persons.12
Parallel to the question whether Robby continues to exist when he is
turned off, we can ask whether people continue to exist while in a coma.
11
One might think that Robby only survives if the two restorations are time-like separated
(i.e., one is in the light-cone of the other), and if they are space-like separated (neither is in
the light-cone of the other), Robby perishes. But then whether Robby survives on earth depends on what happens at a space-like separated point of space. This suggests that there is
something very much like faster-than-light causation. For it seems that by restoring the disk,
the technicians on the space-ship manage to prevent Robby from coming back into existence
on earth!
12
E.g., Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987).
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Parallel to the question of how many electronic persons there are, we can
ask how many humans there are—think of Siamese twins, for instance,
as a way of making this question problematic. And parallel to the question whether Robby’s data is restored on two computers, we can imagine
thought experiments where my brain is split in half, and the two halves
are put in different bodies—where, if anywhere, would I be then?13
I suggested that in the case of electronic persons these questions cannot
be answered. But then how can they be answered in the case of humans?
Here I need to note an assumption in my previous arguments. I was assuming that there was nothing to electronic persons but the hardware and the
software (including data), that there was no further metaphysical reality
beyond these. Thus if we were going to come up with an answer whether
Robby continues to exist while asleep, this answer would have to depend
only on the hardware and the software—there is nothing else there. And
the hardware and the software fail to give an answer to the question.
But exactly the same point can be made about humans. If all there is
to us is a bunch of molecules and a bunch of data encoded in these molecules, then questions of personal identity do not always have objective
answers. If these questions are to have objective answers, there must be
more to us than just molecules and data. What could be this “more” that
makes answers possible? I think it has the traditional name “soul.”14
But even supposing a soul, we do not know what the answer is for some
of these questions. If my brain is split in half, where do I go? Well, if I have
a soul, then I can say that the question is ill-defined. “What if” questions
only make sense if sufficient information is specified. Suppose you are in
a crowded room, and someone asks you: “What if you moved one third
of the human beings from this room to another room, which room would
I be in?” In fact, this has no answer because sufficient information is not
specified. One needs to know whether the questioner would be among
the one-third moved or the two-thirds remaining to answer the question.
Likewise, the question: “If my brain is split in half, where do I go?” has
no answer unless one further specifies which half of the brain my soul
goes with or maybe that my soul goes with none. I will go where my soul
13
It may be worth noting that the thought experiments are fanciful in the human case and
not at all fanciful in the computer case—it’s easy to duplicate computer memory. I do not
know what exactly to make of this disanalogy. One might want to say that the concept of a
“person” does not apply in fanciful situations (see Richard M. Gale, “On Some Pernicious
Thought Experiments,” in Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy ed. T. Horowitz and
J. Massey [Savage, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1991], pp. 297–304). If one says this, then
one will be able to resist the analogy between the human and electronic case. In the case of
humans, we do not expect answers for duplication cases, since these are fanciful cases. In the
case of electronic persons, we would expect answers for duplication cases, since for robots
and computers the cases are not fanciful. But I want to resist this move of relativizing the
concept of “person” to non-outlandish cases.
14
One might also opt for an unanalyzable non-supervenient fact theory of identity, but if
the robot is just hardware and software/data, it’s not clear where that additional fact would
come from. Divine fiat seems the only explanation. It’s also worth noting that I intend what I
say about souls here to be neutral between substance-dualist and hylomorphic views.

500

Faith and Philosophy

will go. This is basically Richard Swinburne’s personal identity argument
for the existence of a soul: only if we have souls can there be answers to
certain questions.15
However, in the case of an electronic person, when we describe what
happens to the hardware and the software, we are in an appropriate sense
describing everything relevant, and so we should be able to get answers.
Assuming electronic persons don’t have anything beyond the hardware
and the software, the question is sufficiently specified once we’ve given
the facts about what happens to the hardware and the software, such as in
my example where Robby’s data is recorded in a disk and restored on two
computers. And yet, even though the question is sufficiently specified, as
there is nothing further to specify, there is still no answer.
If this is right, then computers and robots cannot constitute persons unless, somehow, there is more to them than hardware and software, namely
unless computers and robots will have souls. And by parallel, we cannot
be persons unless we have souls.16
Baylor University

See Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul.
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